G8 Education Ltd’s 5.5% notes due 2019 will be maturing on 18 May next month. As we highlighted in a series of articles since the bond issuance, the childcare provider is a rare issuer in the SGD universe outside the real estate sector that offers attractive return against solid credit ratios. Like us, holders of the GEMAU 5.5% ‘19s might be hard-pressed to find a suitable replacement with similar risk-reward profile.
In general, high-yield companies like G8 Education1 fall into three categories. The first bucket comprises of companies with aggressive financial profile, which saddle their balance sheet with a high amount of debt. The second refers to companies that have or are perceived to have a relatively weak credit profile due to idiosyncratic factors apart from high financial gearing.
These companies may have relatively short operating history and lack investor familiarity. In other cases, they lack geographical or business diversification and are therefore vulnerable to a regional economic recession or an industry downturn. They may also be smaller companies that lack the economy of scale to compete on an equal footing with their larger peers.
Finally, companies in the third category have the potential worst of both worlds—high gearing combined with a vulnerable business profile. This is a category that is best left to sophisticated investors with the ability to diversify their portfolio widely across many credits (and the stomach to tolerate the periodic defaults among their bond holdings).
Ceteris paribus, our advice to high-yield investors is to favor credits like G8 Education that are constrained by their business profile rather than those that are overloaded with debt. When the credit market shuts tight (such as during the global financial crisis in 2008), even profitable companies with positive business outlook can be forced to bankruptcy if it doesn’t have the financial means to meet short-term obligations. On the other hand, companies with healthier balance sheet but weaker business profile have higher chance of surviving through a temporary industry or economic downturn.
In line with the credit profile of G8 Education, our recommendations here will focus on credits of the second category. These issuers generally lack scale, have high revenue concentration in a particular sector or geography, or face deteriorating profitability and business outlook. We believe these weaknesses are outweighed by their moderate leverage and the decent returns offered on their bonds.
We are cognizant that the margin of safety is lower and downside potential higher for high-yield credits. As such, the importance of keeping tabs on the financial health and earnings outlook of high-yield issuers is much higher than investment-grade credits. We have written about most of the following issuers (except for UBS Group AG) in the past, and will continue to provide periodic credit updates in the future.
DEGREE 7.250% 03Jun2021 Corp (USD)
The only USD bond in this list, the DEGREE 7.250% 03Jun2021 Corp (USD) is issued by 361 Degrees International Limited, a sporting goods company selling shoes, apparel, and accessories under its eponymous brand. Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKEx”) with a market capitalization of HKD3.56 billion (~S$615m), 361 Degrees operates chiefly in China, with an extensive distribution of approximately 5,500 stores across the country. A majority of these stores (4,092 or ~74%) are located in China’s third-tier and lower-tier cities, as the company’s business model focuses on the mid-market segment with most of its shoes priced within the RMB200 to RMB500 range.
Both S&P and Fitch downgraded their credit rating on 361 Degrees one notch to ‘BB-‘ in March, shortly after the company announced its lackluster earnings for 2018. In explaining the rationale for its downgrade, S&P warned that 361 Degrees will continue to face intense competition in China’s sportswear industry and weakened operating cash flow. The rating agency also predicted that 361 Degrees will lag behind industry growth-rate due to the company’s low product differentiation and pricing power.
Having reviewed 361 Degrees’ 2018 annual report, we agree with the rating agencies’ assessment. A broad-based decline in the company’s average wholesale selling price led to revenue growth of just 0.6% in 2018. Meanwhile, expenses incurred for a brand rebuilding program and higher mix of e-commerce revenue cut into profit margins, and operating profit margin fell four percentage points to 15.1% (2017: 19.1%). Net income fell 34.6% year-on-year to RMB305.4m (2017: RMB467.3m).
The uninspiring financial performance of 361 Degrees seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future. The company's gross profit margin has remained largely stagnant in the 40-42% range over the past five years, while its operating profit margin declined significantly from 18.5% in 2014. Citing a survey from market-research provider Euromonitor International, S&P said in its March report that 361 Degrees’ market share has declined steadily from 4.1% in 2016 to 3.6% in 2017 and 3.2% in 2018.
If we are bearish on the business outlook of 361 Degrees, why are we bullish on the company’s notes? To put it simply, we like the DEGREE 7.25% ‘21s for two reasons.
Firstly, 361 Degrees is financially healthy with strong credit metrics. In fact, the company is in a net cash position with a large cash balance (excluding pledged deposits) of RMB6.15 billion, against its total borrowings of RMB2.83 billion. Even with its declined profitability in 2018, 361 Degrees’ debt-to-EBITDA ratio (excluding other revenue and other losses/gains) was still decent at 4.0x, albeit lower than the 2.9x recorded in 2017.
Secondly, the 13.3% yield to maturity (“YTM”) offered on the DEGREE 7.25% ‘21s more than compensates for the issuer’s deteriorating earnings in our opinion. While some downward pricing adjustments on the notes are perfectly warranted following 361 Degrees’ weakened performance in 2018 and the credit downgrades by rating agencies, we think in this case the market has overreacted to the negative events. At 13.3% YTM (Z-spread: 1,086bps), we think the notes provide an outsize return for an issuer that has more cash than debt.
Related article: The Hidden Beauty of 361 Degrees Bonds
CENSUN 7.000% 03Jul2020 Corp (SGD)
Established by founder Mr Chi Wen Fu in 2000 as a fertilizer producer in China, Century Sunshine Group Holdings Limited is listed on the HKEx since 2004 and sported a market cap of around HKD1.00 billion (~S$173m) as of 18 Apr 19. Besides manufacturing and selling fertilizer, Century Sunshine is also involved in magnesium mining and magnesium alloy production through its 72.4%-owned, HKEx-listed subsidiary, Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings Limited.
Century Sunshine announced in January its intention to issue USD-denominated senior notes, the proceeds of which were to be used in accordance with the company’s green bond framework. In conjunction with the proposed bond issuance, Moody’s and Fitch assigned credit ratings of ‘B2’ and ‘B’ respectively to Century Sunshine.
However, according to reports from Bloomberg and International Financing Review, Century Sunshine postponed the dollar bond issuance in February. Prior to these news, the company actually launched the book building process for a 1.5-year dollar bond at the price guidance of 14%.
The failure to close the deal sends a signal that there is low demand for Century Sunshine’s debt securities, which increases the company’s refinancing risk. Furthermore, the company’s liquidity profile is weak with short-term borrowing constituting 53% of total debt. As of 31 Dec 18, Century Sunshine faces HKD1.09 billion in short-term maturities (including exchangeable bonds), while its cash balance was just HKD708m.
Nonetheless, Moody’s said in January that it expects Century Sunshine to be able to refinance its bank loans. The rating agency highlighted Century Sunshine’s profitable operations, strong market position, established banking relationships, and proven access to capital markets in supporting its statement.
Indeed, Century Sunshine reported a strong set of results for 2018. Revenue jumped 35.2% YoY to HKD4.66 billion (2017: HKD3.44 billion), supported by healthy growth in sales volume and average selling price in both the fertilizer and magnesium product businesses. Reported gross profit margin dropped marginally to 24.5% (2017: 24.7%), and we estimate EBITDA (excluding results from discontinued operations and other gains/losses) at approximately HKD1 billion, up ~58% YoY (2017: HKD632m).
Century Sunshine’s strong earnings growth in 2018 overshadowed its increase in finance costs, which rose 9.5% YoY to HKD164.9m (2017: HKD150.7m) due to higher borrowings over the year. As a result, the company’s EBITDA/finance costs coverage jumped to 6.1x from 4.0x in 2017. In addition, even though Century Sunshine’s total borrowings rose slightly to HKD2.07 billion at the end of December (31 Dec 17: HKD2.05 billion), we find net gearing (net debt/equity) and debt/EBITDA still healthy at 0.34x (31 Dec 17: 0.31x) and 2.1x (2017: 3.2x) respectively.
The CENSUN 7.000% 03Jul2020 Corp (SGD) is offering YTM of 8.88%, indicating a spread of 694bps above SGD swaps. We think the notes provide generous income relative to Century Sunshine’s moderate debt leverage and good profitability.
Related article: Century Sunshine Group Holdings Limited: Credit Initiation Report
GGRSP 4.750% 25Jan2021 Corp (SGD)
Golden Agri-Resources Ltd (“GAR”) is one of the world’s largest palm oil plantation companies. GAR manages 498,395 hectares (as at 31 Dec 18) of palm oil plantations (including smallholder farmers) in Indonesia—almost seven times the size of Singapore.
GAR is listed on the Singapore Exchange since 1999 and has a market cap of S$3.76 billion as at 18 Apr 19. The firm’s businesses span two segments, namely its upstream business in plantation and palm oil mills, and downstream operations in palm, laurics, and others.
The Widjaja family, among Indonesia’s wealthiest, is GAR’s largest shareholder and owns about half of the company’s shares via Flambo International Limited. The institutional investor Silchester International Investors LLP is the second largest shareholder with a 12% stake.
A severe slump in average palm oil prices took a hit on GAR’s performance in 2018 despite the company posting a record high in production. Average crude palm oil (“CPO”) prices based on free on board price fell 17% YoY to USD565 per metric ton (“MT”). GAR’s production growth of 12% YoY in palm product output (2018: 3.05m MT) was unable to compensate for the weaker selling price, and revenue declined 4.5% YoY to USD7.17 billion (2017: USD7.51 billion).
Reported EBITDA2 dropped 13.8% YoY to USD573.0m (2017: USD664.7m) similarly on softer CPO prices. We note that reported EBITDA was boosted by non-cash “other operating income” amounting to USD125.5m (2017: USD43.9m), which mostly comprised of USD131.5m of fair value gains on financial assets. Excluding such other income, we find adjusted EBITDA 28% lower YoY at USD448m (2017: USD621m).
While GAR’s total debt increased slightly to USD3.01 billion at the end of 2018 (31 Dec 17: USD2.99 billion), net gearing improved to 0.65x from 0.69x over the year. Nonetheless, the improvement was partly driven by a partial divestment of GAR’s 75% stake in Gemini Edibles & Fats India Private Limited in November. The firm raised around USD83.38m of equity through selling existing and new shares in Gemini (56% owned by GAR post-transaction), but the new investor has a put option to sell back all the shares to GAR as one of its exit options.
Finance costs rose 17.7% YoY to USD163.9m (2017: USD139.3m), in line with higher borrowing costs and higher average total debt in 2018. The weaker earnings and higher finance costs led to a lower interest coverage ratio (adjusted EBITDA/finance costs) of 2.7x (2017: 4.5x). GAR’s debt-to-adjusted EBITDA ratio similarly deteriorated to 6.7x in 2018 from 4.8x one year ago.
Despite overall weaker financial metrics, we think GAR’s credit ratios are still manageable, and certainly healthier than what its bond pricing suggests. The GGRSP 4.750% 25Jan2021 Corp (SGD) is indicating at an ask YTM of 7.29% (Z-spread: 535bps), which puts its valuation near the range of the notes of mm2 Asia, Aspial Corp, and Tuan Sing. The MMASIA 7% ‘21s, ASPSP 5.9% ‘21s, and TSHSP 6% ‘20s are offering YTMs of 7.51% (Z-spread: 557bps), 6.65% (Z-spread: 471bps), and 6.14% (Z-spread: 420bps) respectively. While the mentioned issuers are from different industries, we think GAR has a stronger credit profile and provides better value on its GGRSP 4.75% ‘21s.
Related article: Plant Your Income Seeds with Golden Agri-Resources' 4.75% 2021 Bond
HTONSP 6.100% 08May2020 Corp (SGD)
The smallest issuer on this list in terms of both total assets (31 Dec 18: S$855.6m) and market cap (18 Apr 19: S$154m), Heeton Holdings Limited is a Singapore-listed real estate company focused on property development, property investment, and hotel operations and related services.
Since 2011, Heeton has expanded its real estate portfolio to include hospitality assets, and increasingly channeled its resources toward building a recurring income base. The company now owns four investment properties in Singapore, one serviced office in London, and eleven operating hotels across the UK, Japan, and Thailand.
Company founder Mr Toh Khai Cheng (non-executive chairman) and his two sons, Mr Toh Giap Eng (executive deputy chairman) and Mr Toh Gap Seng (alternative director to his father), lead Heeton’s board of directors. Together, the Toh family controls about 69% of the company’s shares.
Although Heeton’s small operating scale and market cap relative to its indebtedness constrain its credit profile, we like the company’s growing recurring income source, manageable financial leverage, and substantial bond ownership by insiders. In 2018, Heeton’s property investment and hospitality segments contributed S$29.2m of external revenue, which represented 53% of total revenue (S$55.1m). The combined profit before tax (“PBT”) from the two segments, excluding fair value gains, was S$13.1m or 68% of total PBT (S$19.2m).
Last year, Heeton continued to focus its investments in hospitality assets, acquiring two new hotels in the UK, one hotel in Japan, and a land in Bhutan to be developed into a boutique hotel. We estimate that the company’s hotel and investment properties are worth S$877m as at 31 Dec 18, or S$529m if we adjust for its stake in these properties. We think the value of Heeton’s hospitality and investment property portfolio provides strong support behind the company’s S$324.2m of borrowings.
While Heeton’s short-term borrowings of S$104.2m exceed the company’s cash and cash equivalents of S$75.0m, we think refinancing risk is low. These short-term borrowings are secured loans, which should be relatively easier to be rolled over.
In addition, Heeton has a low secured debt-to-total asset ratio of 15.3% given that most of the company’s assets are tangible real estate investments. Net gearing is also manageable at 0.59x, which affords Heeton the headroom to borrow more if needed.
Finally, holders of Heeton’s bonds will be happy to know that they are investing alongside the founding Toh family members and other company directors. Based on exchange filings, we estimate that Heeton’s directors hold S$4.25m and S$5.75m in notional amount of the HTONSP 6.100% 08May2020 Corp (SGD) and HTONSP 6.080% 19July2021 Corp (SGD) respectively. To put these numbers in context, the company paid S$1.62m of remuneration and fees to its directors in 2018.
We think both the HTONSP 6.1% ‘20s and HTONSP 6.08% ‘21s look interesting with their ask YTMs of 6.52% (Z-spread: 458bps) and 7.11% (Z-spread: 516bps) respectively. The bonds offer generous carry relative to Heeton’s credit risk and good value among small-to-mid cap Singapore real estate credits.
Related article: Heeton Holdings Limited: Credit Initiation Report
LOGPH 6.125% 16Apr2021 Corp (SGD)
Logan Property Holdings Company Limited is a Chinese property developer founded in 1996. The company is listed on HKEx since 2013 and has a market capitalization of HKD71.1 billion (~S$12.3 billion) as at 18 Apr 19.
According to a survey by the Enterprise Research Institute of Development Research Center of the State Council, The Institute of Real Estate Studies of Tsinghua University, and China Index Academy, Logan Property is ranked 23rd (2018: 26th) among Chinese large-size property developers in terms of overall strength. Logan Property focuses on residential property development in China, mainly in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (“GBA”).
Logan Property carries credit ratings of ‘Ba3’ (Moody’s) and ‘BB-‘ (S&P and Fitch). In November, S&P upgraded its ratings outlook on Logan Property to positive from stable. The credit rating agency expects Logan Property to improve its financial leverage over the next twelve to 18 months, citing the company’s strong sales execution and healthy revenue growth.
S&P also forecasted Logan Property’s look-through debt-to-EBITDA ratio to improve to 4.5-4.7x in 2018, from 5.1x in 2017. Our own calculations find that Logan Property’s EBITDA was at approximately RMB14 billion in 2018, up 53% YoY from ~RMB9 billion the year before. Total borrowings increased 44% over the same period to RMB58.94 billion (31 Dec 17: RMB40.84 billion), which translated to a lower debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 4.2x in 2018 (2017: 4.4x). Reported net gearing ratio similarly dropped to 0.63x from 0.68x in 2018.
We think there is limited potential for Logan Property to improve its credit profile significantly in the foreseeable future, given the company’s land acquisition plans and its revenue concentration in real estate development in China. We understand from management that their yearly land bank budget is typically half of the contracted sales for that year. This strategy, in our view, is likely to result in moderate debt growth although net gearing should be stable.
On the other hand, Logan Property is poised to achieve strong growth and profitability in the next few years on the company’s large land bank in the GBA and favorable government policies. At the end of 2018, Logan Property owns RMB652 billion of total saleable resources, which are more than nine times the company’s contracted sales in 2018 (RMB71.8 billion) and provide good growth visibility. 82% of Logan Property’s total saleable resources are in the GBA, which were acquired at significantly lower costs compared to the company’s peers due to its first-mover advantage.
In February, the Chinese government revealed its plan to develop the GBA into an international finance and technology hub3. While specific implementation measures are still pending, the initiative to turn the GBA into a world-class city cluster is likely to boost population growth and housing demand. The region has immense economic potential, currently accounting for 5% of China’s population but contributes 12% of GDP4.
The LOGPH 6.125% 16Apr2021 Corp (SGD) offers some of the best value in the SGD-denominated property development credit sector. At their YTM of 6.29% (Z-spread: 435bps), we think the LOGPH 6.125% ‘21s are very attractive compared to other SGD high-yield alternatives in the property sector, given Logan Property’s large operating scale and strong earnings visibility.
Related article: Looking for High Yield Real Estate SGD Bonds? Logan Property Could Be Your Best Bet
OHLSP 5.000% 05Nov2019 Corp (SGD) - Retail
From a quick glance at the financials of Oxley Holdings Limited, the company’s credit profile should disqualify it from being included in this list due to our main selection criterion—low-to-moderate leverage. The Singapore property developer’s financial gearing as measured by its net debt-to-equity ratio is elevated, standing at 2.55x at the end of 2018 (30 Jun 18: 2.17x). Furthermore, short-term borrowings shot up to S$1.13 billion (30 Jun 18: S$246.4m), a hefty sum when compared to the company’s cash balance of S$248.5m (30 Jun 18: S$255.0m).
We are sticking our neck out here to predict that Oxley will be able to meet its short-term maturities and improve its credit metrics considerably in the near future. The company has already been proactively tackling its high level of debt through launching asset sales. Oxley’s track record and recent communication and actions provide high credibility in our view that the firm is serious in cutting down its credit risk.
Early this year in January, Oxley announced the sale of Blocks 4 and 5, as well as part of Blocks B and E of Dublin Landings, for an aggregate amount of EUR379.5m or about S$579m. The company then accepted an expression of interest in March from a US-based real estate fund to acquire Chevron House for S$1.025 billion. Shortly thereafter, Oxley appointed property consultants CBRE, Jones Lang LaSalle, and JLL as its agents for the sale of the Novotel and Mercure Hotels on Stevens Road, Singapore.
There is still substantial uncertainty over whether the sales of Chevron House and the two hotels will go through. Indeed, just two days before Oxley’s appointment of agents to sell the two Stevens Road hotels, the company had called off a deal to sell the same hotels at S$950m. Nonetheless, we think the likelihood of either of the transactions being completed is high, given the buoyant outlook for Singapore’s hospitality and office sectors.
(Read the following articles to find out why our stocks research colleagues are bullish on Singapore’s hospitality and office sectors: “After "Crazy Rich Asians", hospitality REITs are the next big investment opportunity” and “The One REIT You Must Have To Ride The Multi-Year Office Upcycle”)
Besides asset divestments, Oxley’s strong earnings visibility also supports its deleveraging plans. The company has S$3.28 billion of unbilled contracts as at 10 Feb 19, and sales have remained decent despite the subdued residential housing market in Singapore. Since 2018, Oxley has sold close to 1,800 homes worth S$1.93 billion in the city-state.
The management has said that they intend to reduce Oxley’s debt-to-equity ratio to 1x, although the timing of their deleveraging plans is uncertain. As we think the company is likely to follow through on its promise, we think its OHLSP 5.000% 05Nov2019 Corp (SGD) - Retail and OHLSP 5.150% 18May2020 Corp (SGD) - Retail look interesting with their YTMs of 5.83% (Z-spread: 390bps) and 7.12% (Z-spread: 518bps) respectively.
Related article: Oxley Holdings: Credit Update (8 Aug 18)
UBS 5.875% Perpetual Corp (SGD)
The final item in our list is also its only perpetual bond, the UBS 5.875% Perpetual Corp (SGD), which has a first call date of 28 Nov 23. If the issuer, UBS Group Funding (Switzerland) AG, chooses to extend—in other words, not call—the perp beyond its first call date, the coupon rate will reset on 28 Nov 23 (and every five years thereafter) to the sum of the prevailing five year SGD swap offer rate and 360.5bps. UBS Group Funding (Switzerland) AG is a wholly-owned subsidiary of UBS Group AG (“UBS”), which is the guarantor of the notes.
UBS is the only investment-grade issuer on this list, with a long-term counterparty credit rating of ‘A-‘ assigned by S&P, and a long-term issuer default rating of ‘A+’ by Fitch. The lender’s strong credit ratings rank it among the most creditworthy commercial banks globally, ahead of its Swiss peer Credit Suisse and other top investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.
So why is the UBS 5.875% perp offering yield to worst (“YTW”) of 5.03% (Z-spread: 303bps)? Because the notes are subordinated debt of the UBS group; they are Additional Tier 1 (“AT1”) instruments, sometimes referred to as “bail-in bonds”.
The main defining characteristic of AT1 capital notes is their loss absorption feature—they are structured to automatically absorb losses when a financial institution is insolvent. In the case of the UBS 5.875% perp, the notes will be automatically and permanently written-down to zero if the applicable Basel III common equity tier 1 (“CET1”) capital ratio of UBS falls below 7%. Holders of the perp will lose the entire amount of their investment in that scenario.
The subordinated ranking of the perp and its write-down trigger are the main reasons why the notes are rated ‘BBB-‘ by Fitch, five notches below UBS’ issuer rating. The loss absorption mechanism might spook some investors who are unfamiliar with bank capital instruments. But we think UBS’ sound capital levels make the occurrence of write-down events highly unlikely.
As of 31 Dec 18, UBS’ CET1 capital ratio was 12.9%, well above the 2020 requirement of 10% for Swiss systemically relevant banks. The bank has also guided the market that it will operate with a CET1 capital ratio of around 13%, which provides a healthy buffer above the 7% write-down trigger stipulated in the UBS 5.875% perp’s terms and conditions.
UBS’ strong market position in Switzerland and solid capital ratios support its business profile. The UBS 5.875% Perpetual Corp (SGD) represents decent value in the SGD bank capital space with its YTW of 5% (Z-spread: 311bps). As a reference, DBS’ 3.98% perp (callable 12 Sep 25) and UOB’s 4% perp (callable 18 May 21) are indicated at YTWs of 3.45% (Z-spread: 137bps) and 3.02% (Z-spread: 108bps) respectively.
Stay tuned: we will follow up with a more detailed analysis of UBS’ credit outlook in the coming weeks
Notes:
1 G8 Education and its bonds are actually unrated, whereas the conventional definition of a high-yield credit is that it carries a credit rating below ‘BBB-‘ (or equivalent) from the leading credit rating agencies. In the context of the SGD bond universe, the initial pricing of the GEMAU 5.5% ‘19s and their price movements in the secondary market suggest that we can treat them as a high-yield issue.
2 GAR’s reported EBITDA equals to the company’s earnings before tax, non-controlling interests, interest on borrowings, depreciation and amortization, net gain or loss from changes in fair value of biological assets, foreign exchange gain or loss and exceptional items.
3 Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Retrieved from https://www.bayarea.gov.hk/filemanager/en/share/pdf/Outline_Development_Plan.pdf
4 Cheung, Eric. (2019, April 1). Greater Bay Area: 10 facts to put it in perspective. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/native/economy/china-economy/topics/great-powerhouse/article/3002844/greater-bay-area-10-facts-put
Declaration:
For specific disclosure, at the time of publication of this report, IFPL (via its connected and associated entities) has a principal position in ASPSP 5.250% 28Aug2020 Corp (SGD) - Retail, ASPSP 5.300% 01Apr2020 Corp (SGD) - Retail, CENSUN 7.000% 03Jul2020 Corp (SGD), DBSSP 3.600% Perpetual Corp (USD), GEMAU 5.500% 18May2019 Corp (SGD), GGRSP 5.350% 05Aug2019 Corp (MYR), HTONSP 6.100% 08May2020 Corp (SGD), LOGPH 6.125% 16Apr2021 Corp (SGD), MMASIA 7.000% 27Apr2021 Corp (SGD), OHLSP 5.000% 05Nov2019 Corp (SGD) - Retail, and OHLSP 6.375% 21Apr2021 Corp (USD). The analyst who produced this report owns shares in Century Sunshine Group Holdings Limited.