Macro Research

The winter is over for the Japanese yen. A liftoff might be in sight

After last year’s bloodshed, a yen liftoff looks increasingly likely in 2023.

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  • Published on 17 Mar 2023

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  • After extreme weakening in 2022, the yen has found its footing recently. We maintain our view of a potential reversal and see a rising likelihood of a yen appreciation this year.

  • Three factors that may spark further yen strengthening: (1) normalisation of monetary policy, (2) pressure from domestic conditions, and (3) re-direction of investor flows to the yen.

  • While a weaker yen tends to be supportive of Japanese equities, we believe a rebound at such extreme levels should not detract from equity performance. We prefer an unhedged share class to maintain exposure to the yen.

2022 was a watershed year for the Japanese yen, one of the worst-performing currencies. The currency weakened against most major currencies, falling by a dramatic -19.6% against the greenback (Chart 1). In real effective exchange rate terms – the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies adjusted by consumer prices – the yen also fell by -11% to an all-time low (Chart 2). 

The currency weakness was so severe that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had to intervene in the currency market to shore up the battered yen for the first time since the 1998 Asian financial crisis. However, the yen found its footing in December, strengthening against broad currencies as the BOJ shocked markets by adjusting its long-standing yield curve control policy (YCC). The currency has since stabilised in anticipation of the shift in the BOJ governor. 

Looking back, recent developments from the BOJ have validated our call in mid-October for a near-term stabilisation and potential reversal this year. We maintain our view of a potential reversal and see a rising likelihood of a yen appreciation this year, underpinned by factors such as: (1) normalisation of monetary policy, (2) pressure from domestic conditions, and (3) re-direction of investor flows to the yen.

Chart 1: Yen has depreciated significantly relative to G10 currencies and the SGD last year…

 

Chart 2: …The REER has also fallen to an all-time low last year but has since rebounded


 
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What drove the bloodshed in 2022?


Multiple factors contributed to the weakness of the Japanese yen in 2022. One of the major drivers was a widening interest rate differential, born from policy divergence between the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and global central banks. While overseas central banks expeditiously raised rates to combat inflation last year, the BOJ has retained its unyielding accommodative stance that aimed to support the country's recovery from the impact of the pandemic. The BOJ’s accommodative monetary policy involves the use of YCC that artificially keeps policy rates and Japanese government bond yields low through the purchase of large amounts of Japanese government bonds (JGB). 

Under the YCC policy, the BOJ seeks to control the Japanese yield curve by fixing short-term rates (at -0.1%) and the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (at 0%), while maintaining a target band for JGB yields. Due to the influence of the YCC, front-end rates for Japan are near zero while that of many major economies have surged due to a wave of rate hikes. This has led to a widening of interest rate differential between BOJ and global central banks (Chart 3), severely weakening the yen as selling pressure from carry trades deepened and investors sought stronger returns elsewhere. 

Japan’s gaping trade deficit further reinforced pressure on the plummeting yen. A weaker yen and higher energy import costs have driven Japan’s trade balance deep in the red (Chart 4). Japan recorded a trade deficit of JPY 897 billion in February 2023, extending the shortfall for a consecutive 19th month. The sudden, large fall in export prices relative to import prices resulted in a trade shock (negative terms of trade shock) that further drove yen weakness. 

Chart 3: Widening yield differential drove severe yen weakness last year but we expect that to reverse in 2023

 

Chart 4: A weaker yen and costlier energy imports have worsened Japan’s trade deficit which in turn put downward pressure on the currency

 

Major drivers for the yen 


1. Normalisation of monetary policy (potential removal of YCC)


Increasing expectations of a reversal of BOJ’s ultra-easy monetary policy this year – and a potential end to the YCC – will put upward pressure on the yen this year. Recent actions like the modification to the YCC in December and policymakers’ comments about reviewing monetary policy have emboldened our belief that the BOJ is warming up to the idea of normalisation. The odds of a BOJ policy review have risen. With the impending change in leadership, it can be an opportune time to embark on policy normalisation. 

Professor Kazuo Ueda, a former board member, will succeed Haruhiko Kuroda as the new governor. We see the choice for Ueda as a balanced pick, neither overly dovish nor hawkish based on his past comments and recent answers during the parliamentary confirmation hearing. At the same time, pressure from domestic economic conditions, as well as a worsening of bond market functioning (outlined below), are also putting pressure on the BOJ to review its monetary policy. This change in BOJ governor, therefore, sets the stage for normalising monetary policy and we now see higher odds of tighter policy this year. 

A removal of the YCC or policy rate hikes may be the most hawkish option from the BOJ, but we do not rule out its possibility. Instead, we believe the central bank will first take a gradual approach to maintain calm in the market as tweaks/abolishment of the YCC will be seen as a big deal. In that sense, broadening target bands for JGB yields seems more likely than either raising the target yields or a complete exit from the YCC.

No matter the outcome – (1) exiting the YCC; (2) widening the band;  (3) shifting the control of 10-year JGB to 5-year JGB, or (4) raising the short-term and 10-year target rates  – we expect JGB yields to move higher, especially the longer end. Before the Silicon Valley Bank incident, markets continued to test the BOJ as 10-year JGB yields are trading near the ceiling while the 10-year swap yield, which is not subjected to the YCC, is trading at almost 0.9%. These are indicative of the upward pressure on long-term yields.  

Chart 5: Before the Silicon Valley Bank incident, 10-year JGB yields were trading near the ceiling. The swap yield suggests upwards pressure on 10-year JGBs.

 
This should support the yen by dampening the global selling pressure from the yen carry trade. More importantly, this also narrows the interest rate differential between the BOJ and foreign central banks, which would then strengthen the yen. Rising expectations of this narrowing can be seen via the forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates, a gauge of where overnight borrowing costs in the interbank market will be (Chart 6). Already, markets are pricing in an above-zero policy rate three months from now (positive forward 1-month Japan OIS rate, a proxy for policy rate) and even higher rates after. This is in contrast to the US and Europe, where markets expect the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB) to reduce rates as soon as six months after.

Chart 6: Markets are expecting higher policy rates from the BOJ three months from now and lower rates from Fed and ECB six months from now.



2. Domestic and financial conditions are exerting pressure on the BOJ 


Core CPI in Japan rose to 4.0% year-on-year in December 2022, the highest in over four decades, while price pressure has broadened across the CPI items (Chart 7). Inflation is likely to moderate as the base effect hits in February, energy and food prices recede, and with the government subsidies on electricity. While the direction for inflation is lower, the pace might be slow as stronger wage growth and recovery in consumption may contribute to stickier inflation.

The BOJ believes that the rise in basic wages (also referred to as base-up/basic portion), a key component in Japan’s wages, will need to hit 3% to achieve a 2% inflation target in a sustainable manner. This has brought much attention to Japan’s spring wage negotiations (Shunto), an annual wage negotiation between unions and employers, and the call for stronger wage growth is mounting. On one hand, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), which is the largest national trade union representing the public and private sector, announced that its member unions were requesting average base pay rise of 2.8%. On the other, Prime Minister Kishida has publicly called for faster wage hikes. More recently, on the Shunto day, media has reported that many of Japan's biggest firms have already promised large pay hikes.

With political pressure and pushback from the public as living expenses climb, we see a high likelihood that basic wages will rise this year. Even if it fails to hit 3%, a pick-up in basic wage growth, alongside the ongoing recovery in consumption (tourism and domestic recovery), may add to the stickiness of inflation, giving a reason for the BOJ to normalise monetary policy.

Aside from domestic factors, the BOJ may also be compelled to normalise monetary policy given the ongoing deterioration in JGB market functioning (Chart 8). This was the primary reason that drove the YCC tweaks in December. These tweaks have proved to be insufficient to fix the underlying issues as a look at the recent BOJ bond market survey (in Feb) showed that the issues in the bond market have worsened despite December’s remedy.

Therefore, there is a need for the new BOJ leadership to do more – perhaps bigger tweaks to the YCC – given the impact on Japan’s corporate financing and a potential acceleration of financial stress if left unfixed. 

Chart 7: Major measures of CPI have surged to multi-decade highs 

 

Chart 8: The Japanese bond market functioning deteriorated further even after December’s YCC tweaks, prompting further intervention


3. Investor flows re-directed to the yen


The yen is traditionally a safe-haven currency, which tends to strengthen during risk-off periods or when the global outlook is expected to deteriorate. Given last year’s poor performance, the currency has not been an effective safe-haven asset. As shown in Table 1, the yen has historically strengthened against the USD and trade partners during risk-off episodes as early as the 2000s. However, this failed to materialise last year, during which global equities fell by -27% but the yen weakened against the USD and its trade partners (Table 1). 

This happened as investors flocked to the USD instead of conventional safe-haven currencies, such as the yen, given the expeditious rise in Fed policy rates. That said, we expect safe-haven flows to be re-directed back to the yen. This is increasingly likely if a US recession occurs as this puts the spotlight on Japan’s relative economic strength, boosting the yen’s safe-haven appeal (We expect a rosier macro outlook for Japan within developed markets. See related article). Higher JGB yields this year could also bolster the yen’s safe-haven appeal. 

Related article:

In addition, the easing of border restrictions should also strengthen inflows from inbound tourism and investments. While these inflows have picked up in 4Q22, we expect them to accelerate this year. Finally, foreign buying of Japanese assets should also contribute to inflows that will further support the yen’s strength. The strong correlation between the change in USDJPY and the value of foreign net buy/sell of Japanese stocks implies that overseas investor flow is a strong driver of the yen, at least in the nearer-term (Chart 9). We see several factors that could encourage greater foreign buying, including a rosier outlook for Japanese equities relative to its developed market and Asian peers, or a higher yield environment for Japanese bonds.

Table 1: Historically, the yen has strengthened relative to USD/trade partners during risk-off episodes except for the current one



Chart 9: Strong correlation between the change in USDJPY and the value of foreign net buy/sell of Japanese stocks 


 

How will a stronger yen impact Japanese equities?


Historically, a weaker yen has proven supportive for Japanese equities, largely through the boost in earnings as many companies derive significant revenue overseas. While this is true, we do not expect it to detract from the performance of Japanese equities as we see positives associated with a yen appreciation from an extremely undervalued level. 

First, a yen strengthening can help quell some pressing macro risks, such as the trade deficit and high consumer prices, both of which resulted from a greater pass-through of higher import costs and are headwinds that will weigh on Japan’s growth.  Second, a stronger yen may renew the optimism of foreign investors, most of whom have reduced their ownership in Japanese equities since the pandemic, towards Japan. As outlined in the prior section, this can be positive for the yen as it results in greater foreign inflows (net buying of Japanese equities by foreign investors). 

Third, a stronger yen can magnify total returns for foreign investors or provide an extra buffer for any equity downside. This can be observed from 2015 to 2016, during which the yen strengthened by almost 20% against the dollar after the launch of Abenomics 2.0. During this period, the Nikkei 225 Index fell -20% in local currency terms but just -2% in dollar terms. 

In our view, the positives associated with a stronger yen should outweigh the negatives for Japanese equities. Furthermore, we think the BOJ will avoid making drastic changes to the YCC and will provide ample forward guidance to cushion market shocks. This should limit knee-jerk reactions across Japanese equity markets. Lastly, we note that a potential yen strengthening will take place at a time when the currency is extremely weak, thus an appreciation might not have the same drawback as an appreciation when the yen is around historical levels. 

Given our view of the yen, we prefer an unhedged share class to maintain exposure to the yen. For investors who wish to seek exposure to Japan’s equity market, we have three recommendations. For a market-neutral exposure and a passive approach, we recommend the iShares MSCI Japan ETF. For investors who prefer heavier exposure to quality growth companies, we recommend the JPMorgan Funds - Japan Equity A (dist) SGD, which provides exposure to fast-growing industries such as the internet and automation. For investors who prefer a more cyclical and value-oriented exposure, we recommend the Eastspring Investments - Japan Dynamic AS SGD, which provides greater exposure in the financials, industrials, materials, and consumer discretionary sectors. 

The Research Team is part of iFAST Financial Pte Ltd.

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