China's rate reform a long-term positive for the economy, but short-term pain for banks may ensue

China took a major step towards interest rate liberalisation with the announcement of new reforms last month, bringing the country’s financial system closer to global standards. We go through the changes and assess the possible impact these reforms could have on China’s banking sector.

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  • Published on 19 Sep 2019

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China took a major step towards interest rate liberalisation with the announcement of new reforms last month, bringing the country’s financial system closer to global standards.

Under the old system, the price of loans in China was tightly controlled by the PBOC through the use of benchmark rates, which were less reflective of current market conditions compared to market-based rates.

The new loan prime rate will replace the existing benchmark lending rates and is expected to better reflect the current conditions in China’s economy.

We expect the reforms to have a slight negative impact on the Big Four banks in the near-term, but the overall impact should be positive in the long run.

China took a huge step towards interest rate liberalisation with the announcement of new reforms last month, bringing the country’s financial system closer to global standards. The move is expected to simplify the current rate system, while at the same time improve the loan pricing mechanism.


Understanding China’s credit system

Under the old system, China’s central bank (PBOC) maintains control over loan pricing by setting multiple benchmark rates, such as the one-year lending rate, five-year lending rate, deposit rate etc. Using these benchmark rates as a reference, mainland Chinese banks will then set the interest rate for mortgages, loans and deposits for their customers.

This method of utilising multiple benchmark rates to control the price of loans is not only extremely confusing, but also different from most countries where loans are priced based on how much banks are charged to borrow money over the short-term, plus a spread that is dependent on the borrower’s credit profile. 

For example, in the US, the rate at which banks charge each other for overnight loans is known as the federal funds rate, one of the most widely-watched interest rates worldwide, and is also the benchmark on which most US loans are priced.

The key problem with the old system is that because banks tend to price their loans with reference to the benchmark rates, the cost of credit does not reflect the changing risks in the economy as well as loans that are priced using market-based interest rates. This was evident in China’s economy over the past few years.

Despite undergoing several significant changes, such as the start of a deleveraging campaign, slowing economic growth and a trade war with the US, the one-year benchmark lending rate still stands at 4.35%, unadjusted since December 2015 (Figure 1). This hardly reflects the changing conditions within China’s economy.

Figure 1: China’s benchmark lending rates do not reflect changes in its economy well


In contrast, the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), which is continuously adjusted by the Federal Open Market Committee at regular intervals based on the latest financial and economic data, is a much better measure of the overall risk within the economy. 

The existence of benchmark rates also impedes the transmission of monetary policy. Over the past few quarters, the PBOC has repeatedly sought to bring down the borrowing cost for SMEs in order to support its weakening economy, but has been unsuccessful thus far (Figure 2). 

One reason is the fact that many banks are unwilling to offer loans below the benchmark lending rates, even to borrowers with good credit quality in order to protect their profit margins. This is another reason why the PBOC is introducing new reforms.

Figure 2: Despite numerous efforts from the PBOC, borrowing costs in China have not declined


The new loan prime rate should better reflect current economic conditions

The newly-implemented interest rate reforms will see China replace the current one-year benchmark lending rate with the new loan prime rate (LPR). The new LPR will be calculated based on the average interest rate for one-year loans submitted by 18 different banks, after excluding the highest and lowest quotations. It will be announced by the National Interbank Funding Centre on the 20th of each month. 

These 18 banks are required to price their loans with reference to the medium-term lending facility (MLF), which is considered to be more representative of the current economic conditions in China. The MLF is the rate at which banks can borrow additional funds from the PBOC for a period of three months to a year, and is set during the PBOC’s open market operations much like the FFR.

Moving forward, all the other banks in China will be required to use the LPR as a basis for pricing their loans. In essence, the reforms essentially link borrowing costs to the MLF, a major step towards interest rate liberalisation for China. 

With a long history of using benchmark rates to control the use of credit in its economy, one of the objectives of the reform is to change the way interest rates work, bringing them closer to global standards as China starts to open up its capital markets. This means moving the credit system from one that is tightly-controlled by the government to one that is more market-determined. 

Another objective of China’s rate reforms is to lower the borrowing costs as its economy slows. By linking the new LPR to the MLF, the PBOC hopes to bring down the interest rate on future loans, especially for companies in the private sector. At present, the MLF carries an interest rate of 3.3%, 105 bps lower than the one-year benchmark lending rate of 4.35%.

Overall impact should be positive in the long-term

Although the true impact these reforms will have on the Big Four banks is hard to establish at this juncture, we should be able to get a clearer picture over the next few quarters as they report their earnings. That said, we do believe that a few possible scenarios could play out.

In the near-term, lower lending rates should lead to a compression in net interest margins and a decline in profitability for banks. However, with the government still wary about the amount of leverage in the economy, we think that the likelihood of a sudden and sharp fall in the LPR is very unlikely as it could potentially lead to a rapid expansion of credit and higher NPL ratios.

Moreover, we note that the negative impact of lower lending rates can be partially offset by a corresponding decrease in the funding cost for the Big Four banks, owing to the larger proportion of deposits in their funding mix and government policies such as the TMLF.

On the other hand, there is also the possibility that margins remain stable in the event that the reforms do not work as planned. Investors should bear in mind that a lower LPR does not automatically lead to a fall in average loan rates. Banks should still price their loans according to the credit quality of the borrower, with higher rates assigned to borrowers with poorer credit quality.

Looking ahead, we believe that interest rate liberalisation should be beneficial for China’s economy in the long run as it would help to improve loan pricing and capital allocation by channelling funds to the more productive areas of the economy. Doing so will likely promote sustainable economic growth and possibly reduce default rates.

Taking into account the downward pressure on the profitability of banks in the short-term, we have adjusted our estimated potential upside for the Big Four banks down from 58% to 46%. The new potential upside also takes into account the rise in share prices since our last update.

That said, we continue to remain positive on China’s Big Four banks due to the huge valuation mismatch between their intrinsic value and share price, as well as their attractive dividend yields of roughly 6% (Table 1). Value-oriented investors who are seeking long-term capital appreciation and income can consider investing in this idea through the BMO Hong Kong Banks ETF (HKEX:3143)

Table 1: China’s Big Four banks are still trading at steep discounts to their estimated intrinsic value
2021E ROE (%) Cost of Equity (%) Fair PB Ratio 2020 Target Price (HKD) Current Price (HKD) Upside Potential (%) Dividend Yield (%)
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 12.2 12.7 0.95 7.20 5.40 33.3 5.34
China Construction Bank 12.4 12.5 1.00 9.00 6.18 45.6 5.80
Bank Of China 10.8 12.8 0.80 4.80 3.17 51.4 6.70
Agricultural Bank Of China 11.9 13.0 0.90 4.90 3.17 54.6 6.39
Average 11.8 12.8 0.91 - - 46.0 6.10
Source: Bloomberg, iFAST estimations

Table 2: China’s financial sector is expected to record positive earnings growth going forward
2018 2019E 2020E 2021E
Forward PE Ratio 7.30 6.68 6.35 5.86
Expected Earnings Growth (%) -3.91 9.20 5.18 8.46
Forward EPS (HKD) 2,262 2,470 2,598 2,818
Source: Bloomberg, iFAST compilations
The H-Financials index is used as a proxy for the earnings outlook of China’s financial sector

Figure 3: Over the long run, share prices are driven by earnings 


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